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PART II
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
HUGER SINKLER*
General Assembly Denied
Right to Fix Price of Milk
Perhaps the most interesting decision rendered by the
Supreme Court in the period covered by this review in the
field of constitutional law is the divided Court opinion, in
the case of Gwynette v. Myers.' The case is of unusual in-
terest to the student of constitutional law. The decision ren-
dered invalid the State's statute relating to fixing of prices
for wholesale and retail sales of milk. The facts of the case
are as follows:
Under a 1955 enactment of the Legislature, the State
Dairy Commission, which had been created by the General
Assembly in 1953, was given the power, after a public hear-
ing, to declare a state of emergency to exist in any marketing
area, and thereupon to fix the minimum prices to be charged
for milk in such area by producers, distributors and re-
tailers. The defendant operated a large retail store in Green-
ville County and had been in the practice of attracting cus-
tomers by selling milk considerably under its cost to him and
he refused to discontinue this practice when so requested
by the Dairy Commission. His action and the action of others
disrupted the market with consequent dire effects upon the
producer. As a result of the d~fendant's price cutting prac-
tices, the State Dairy Commission, in 1959, held the hearing
called for in the statute, and on the basis of the testimony so
taken, found that an emergency existed justifying the exer-
cise of its price fixing powers in the Greenville-Spartanburg
market. The Commission thereupon proceeded to establish
minimum wholesale, retail and producer prices for milk in
the Greenville-Spartanburg market, effective September 1,
1959, and so notified the defendant. The defendant, how-
ever, continued to sell milk below cost and beneath the
minimum retail price set by the Commission after the ef-
*Sinkler, Gibbs and Simons, Charleston, S. C.
1. 237 S. C. 17, 115 S. E. 2d 673 (1960).
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feetive date of the Commission's price-fixing order. There-
upon, the plantiff, State Dairy Commission, brought an
action to enjoin the defendant from selling milk at retail
below the minimum price fixed by the Commission.
The scope 'of the question for consideration by the Court
is stated in the majority opinion as follows:
The primary ground'of the demurrer is that the price-
fixing provisions of the Act and of the Commission's
orders issued-by virtue thereof deny the defendant the
due process and equal protection guaranteed by Article
I, Section 5 of the-Constitution of South Carolina. Stated
otherwise, the question is: 'May the State fix the price
at which a retail grocer may sell milk?
In disposing of this question the Court stated a basic pre-
mise which is so important that it must be quoted:
The right of a citizen to engage in lawful business, to
make contracts, and to dispose of his property, is not
absolute; it is subject to regulation and control by the
state in the exercise of its police power. But that power,
though an essential attribute of sovereignty, is also not
absolute; it may be exercised only for the protection of
the public in its health, safety, morals or general wel-
fare. Gasque, Inc. v. Nates, 191 S. C. 271, 2 S. E. 2d
36 (1938).
However, the majority reached the conclusion that in-
volved here was no question of public health, safety, or mor-
als, and therefore decided that it was not within the police
power of the General Assembly to fix minimum prices for
selling milk. In reaching this conclusion, the majority re-
fused to consider the factual findings which were the basis
of the legislative action. The Legislature had found as fol-
lows:
1. That all states bordering on South Carolina have
adopted as state policy control over milk pricing.
2. That milk was an essential food for the population.
3. That because of its highly perishable nature, the pro-
duction of milk is surrounded by unusual sanitary re-
quirements which have been imposed by the State in
the exercise of its police power.
4. That milk cannot be kept in constant and adequate
supply unless there is a reasonable chance for those
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol14/iss2/2
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
who produce it to recover the cost of operating under
the highly restricted conditions imposed by law.
5. That unless some form of state action is taken, chaotic
conditions will result in the industry with consequent
harm to the public.
The majority was not impressed with these facts, nor by
the circumstance of the immediate emergency which brought
about the action on the part of the state agency to whom was
delegated the power to enforce the law. On the contrary, it
concluded that any attempt at price fixing was foreign to
our doctrine of free enterprise, and for that reason it joined
the Supreme Court of Georgia as the second state tribunal
of last resort to invalidate state action in this field. It re-
jected holdings of at least 15 State Supreme Courts sustaining
similar legislation, and noted what it referred to as the recent
spread of a paternalistic tendency of governmental control
of private business.
It seems to the writers that the basic objection to govern-
mental control, which is so widespread in South Carolina and
elsewhere among the conservative thinkers of the country, is
and should be more concerned with federal control rather than
with control stemming from state legislative action. That
federal action in areas where no constitutional grant exists
is unconstitutional is a premise with which we have no
quarrel. Clearly, those who wrote the Constitution of the
United States believed that the exercise of the police power
was a power reserved to the States and not to the Federal
Government. Many of us have forgotten this premise, and
occasionally one must re-read decisions rendered in the first
decades of the century to recall the fact that it has only been
recently that the Federal Government undertook the exercise
of police powers. One of the most interesting decisions of
that generation is the Supreme Court decision in the case of
United States v. Nigro,2 which upheld federal action to regu-
late the sale of narcotics. The majority opinion by Chief
Justice Taft sustains what the public now assumes to be an
every day power of the Federal Government on the strained
conclusion that the regulations were incident to the power of
taxation. The minority opinion points out how unreason-
able was this assumption. Chief Justice Taft noted:
2. 276 U. S. 332, 72 L. Ed. 600 (1928).
[Vol. 14
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in interpreting the act, we must assume that it is a
taxing measure, for otherwise it would be no law at all.
If it is a mere act for the purpose of regulating and
restraining the purchase of the cpiate and other drugs,
it is beycn-d the power of Congress ....
It seems to us that because of this growing general indigna-
tion against the unwarranted extension of federal police
regulations, there has grown a tendency to void state action
from the same point of view. Forgotten at times seems to be
the principle that a state constitution is not a grant of pow-
ers, but only creates specific limits or barriers beyond which
legislative action is proscribed. Where state legislative power
is unrestricted by constitutional limitation, it is plenary.
Historically, in the early days of the colony of South Caro-
lina, price fixing was regarded as necessary to protect the
public welfare and action in that field appears as early as
1766. in that year a scarcity of rice produced exorbitant
prices and induced the Provincial Assembly to take action to
safeguard the needs of the inhabitants of this colony. Ac-
cordingly, the exportation of rice from South Carolina until
September 1, 1766, was prohibited and a minimum price
established in order that those who were prevented from
exporting rice would have a local market.3
This interesting act points up the fact that the free men
of the colony made the good of the public paramount. It
was on that basis that the legislative action above described
was taken.
The analogy is, of course, apparent. It is not for the pur-
pose of promoting the welfare of the milk dealers that the
legislation here was enacted, but to promote the good of the
public in order to insure availability of an adequate supply
of milk under sanitary conditions. The queston is close, of
course, for if the true intent was the endeavor to promote
the welfare of the milk producers, no public purpose would
be promoted and the act would fail for the reasons given in
the majority opinion. On the theory that the public welfare
is the object of the legislation, we view sympathetically the
dissenting opinion, for it seems that the object of the "pater-
nalistic effort" here was not for the benefit of the milk pro-
3. 4 Stat. 236 (1766).
1962]
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ducer, but, on the contrary, for the benefit of the public at
large.
There can be no doubt that the police power is limited
to steps required for the benefit of the general public, and
that the courts have the responsibility to carefully scrutinize
this type of legislation. Nevertheless, in the case under re-
view, the majority opinion is far from convincing in its
basic premise that "involved here is no question of public
health, safety or morals." The legislative findings noted in
the dissenting opinion present a situation where the public
health, safety and welfare appear very much involved.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that acts
similar to that concerned here do not violate the due"
process and equal protection provisions of the Federal Con-
stitution, i.e., that state action in such cases restricting the
individual's liberty to contract is not an improper exercise of.
the state's police power forbidden by the Federal Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fed-
eral Constitution, however, is not conclusive of the interpreta-
tion of similar provisions of the State Constitution. Therefore,
the South Carolina Court was free to determine whether or
not the act in the instant case was unconstitutional.
"Sunday Law" Upheld
A second case of more than passing interest is the deci-
sion rendered by the late Chief Justice Stukes in the case of
Carolina Amusement Co. v. Martin.4 In this case an un-
successful attempt was made to enjoin the enforcement of
the so-called "Sunday Law" prohibiting the showing of mo-
tion pictures on Sunday. As noted by the Court, the statute
involved was of ancient origin, and referred to such forgot-
ten pastimes as bear baiting and bullrbaiting. There was no
specific prohibition against the showing of motion pictures
as such and as a consequence the Court had first to determine
that the showing of motion pictures was embraced within
the contemplation of the statute. Citing previous decisions
to the effect that golf, baseball and automobile racing had
been held to be within the ban of the statute, although un-
known at the time of its enactment, the Court properly con-
eluded that motion pictures fell in this category. It then be-
4. 236 S. C. 558, 115 S. E. 2d 273 (1960), cert. denied, U.S. ,6 L.
Ed. 2d 1248 (1961).
[Vol. 14
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came necessary to dispose of the constitutional question that
the prohibition against showing motion pictures offended
constitutional provisions respecting the establishment *of
religion and the free exercise thereof. Reaching the conclu-
sion that there was a sound distinction between a statute
requiring religious observance of a particular day from one,
merely requiring the forbearing of labor on that day, the,
Court upheld the Sunday statute.- It thus coneluded that the
question of freedom of religion had no part in the disposition
of the question. Likewise it held that inasmuch as "the Sunday"
statute was valid, rights protected by the due process clause
were not invaded and that the statute did not uncnsti-,
tutionally restrict free speech or the freedom: of press. Chief
Justice Stakes concluded by noting that while it ,was- the
religious influence that inspired the enactment of this statute,
only two centuries ago, it had been reenacted without refer-
ence to religion, and as a consequence, the. Court held- that
it was a reasonable exercise of police power'to provide. day
of rest. The Court noted that if revision of the law *vas, to,'
follow, .it would have to be done *by the Legislature and not
the Court.
This unanimous decision has -much to commend it, for
while religious freedom is undoubtedly protected by the Con-
stitution-as it should be-our Constitution was written by
those who had the notion that they were founding a Christian
civilization, whose precepts and principles were worthy of
respect by all citizens of this country irrespective of their,
beliefs or disbeliefs in'the matter of the Creator. From many
of these precepts our legal principles concerning the 'dignity
of the individual have arisen, and recognition of the Christian
day of worship should bring occasion to reflect upon other
Christian precepts which have expressed themselves in the
way of life attempted, to be secured by the American Con-
stitution.
It is worthy of note that certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court in..this case has been denied. 5
"Kickbacl" Legislation Upheld
In the decision of Cox v. Bates," the Supreme Court sust-
tained the legislation providing for the creation of a stats
5. Carolina Amusement Co. v. Martin, supra note 4.
6. 237 S. C. 198, 116 S. E. 2d 828 (1960).
1962]
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surplus and "kickbacks" of certain state revenues to the
counties for school purposes against an attack upon a num-
ber of constitutional grounds.
The legislation under attack essentially provided for two
things. First, it provided that any unexpended state revenues
lying in the treasury from a preceding fiscal year should be
transferred to a General Fund Reserve until it reached
$3,000.000. Secondly, it provided that surplus moneys lying
in the state treasury from the preceding fiscal year, after the
General Fund Reserve had been brought to the prescribed
limit, should be appropriated annually to the counties in pro-
portion to their public school pupil enrollment to be used for
general public school purposes as directed by a majority of
the legislative delegations including the senator.
The above quoted provision of the act was alleged by the
plaintiffs to be unconstitutional in violation of Section 14
of Article I of the South Carolina Constitution, which re-
quires the separation of the powers of the several branches
of the State Government and prohibits the exercise of the
function of one of the departments, in this case the executive
function of spending appropriated funds, by a member of
another department. The defendants conceded the point that
the quoted provision should be stricken under the authority
of Dean v. Timmerman.
7
The Court held that the act, minus the quoted provision,
should nevertheless be allowed to stand, pointing to the fact
that the Legislature, by amending the law in 1959 and again
in 1960 after the Dean decision, showed its intent that the
law should remain in force without the invalid quoted pro-
vision. Furthermore, on this point, the Court noted that the
funds could be administered and disbursed in the counties by
their respective proper authorities, presumably the County
Boards of Education, for the purposes designated in the act.
One of the most interesting questions here presented was
whether Article X, Section 2, of the South Carolina Con-
stitution prohibited the creation of a surplus fund and fur-
ther, whether it prohibited the appropriation of surplus
funds to the counties. The Court concluded that this section
deals not with a surplus but with a deficit and that its re-
quirement is that taxes shall be levied to meet such a deficit.
7. 234 S. C. 35, 106 S. E. 2d 665 (1959).
[Vol. 14
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In reviewing the decisions on the point, the Court concludes
that the purpose of this section was to require that the or-
dinary expenses of the State should be met from year to
year and paid from annual income and public debt should
not be created for the purpose of liquidating ordinary ex-
penses. The opinion further noted that while tax receipts in
former times received largely from ad valorem property taxes
could be estimated with a degree of certainty, now tax re-
ceipts depend largely upon business in general and the actual
receipts often fall far short or greatly exceed the estimates.
Therefore, the Court concluded that the General Assembly
which has plenary powers except as limited by the State or
Federal Constitution, has the right to create a surplus fund
to cover future deficits and to "kickback" certain surplus
funds to the counties. The Court's appreciation of the true
nature of the attack appears from the following language:
Therefore plaintiff and others so minded may seek at
the ballot box remedy for what they consider to be a
wrong. Much of his argument here is, wittingly or not,
concerned with legislative policy, with which the court
has nothing to do.
The opinion noted that the creation of the Reserve Fund
by transferring unused funds in the state treasury to the
General Fund Reserve is not an appropriation in the ordi-
nary meaning of the word. On the other hand, the "kickback"
to the counties is an appropriation. The plaintiff contended
that this appropriation was unconstitutional because it was
to continue for future years. However, the Supreme Court
in striking down this contention noted that our decisions
have long confirmed the right of the General Assembly to
make so-called continuing appropriations so long as it also
appropriates therefor a special fund and that in this case the
surplus constitutes such a special fund.
What Constitutes "Doing Business Within the State"
In the case of Boney v.. Trans-State Dredging Co.,8 (two
separate actions involving the same questions), the Court
had before it the question of what constitutes "doing busi-
ness within the State" so as to subject the foreign corpora-
tion to the jurisdiction of our courts without violating the
due process clause of the State and Federal Constitutions.
8. 237 S. C. 54, 115 S. E. 2d 508 (1960).
1962]
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The plaintiffs, residents of Allendale County, alleged in
their complaint that they were traveling downstream on
the Savannah River at a place where the defendant was en-
gaged in dredging operations on the South Carolina side of
the river; that the plaintiffs, after being signaled to do so
from the defendant's dredge, attempted to pass between the
dredge and the South Carolina bank of the river when the
-dredge shifted its position, causing a cable that ran from
the dredge under the surface of the river to the South Caro-
lina bank to rise up and overturn the boat in which the plain-
tiffs were traveling, resulting in injuries to the plaintiffs.
These actions were brought in personam and service was
sought to be effected by two methods: (1) substituted ser-
-vice of the summons upon the Secretary of State of South
Carolina pursuant to Section 12-722 of the 1952 Code and
(2) personal service upon an employee of the defendant
corporation. The court below held the attempted service in-
effectual because (a) at the time of the alleged accident and
of the attempt of service, the defendant was not doing busi-
ness in the State within the meaning of Section 12-722 and
(b) the defendant's aforesaid employee was not an officer
or agent upon whom valid service could be made under Sec-
tion 10-421. On appeal, the Supreme Court considered the
crucial question to be: Was the defendant doing business
in this State at the time of the accident? Upon resolving
this question in the affirmative, the decision of the lower
court was reversed.
The defendant's dredging operations in which it was en-
gaged at the time of the accident extended over a continuous
period of more than ten months and over an area of 142
miles along the Savannah River. These operations were con-
ducted sometimes on the Georgia side and sometimes on the
South Carolina side of the river and involved the cutting of
banks on both sides of the river. The boundary between the
States of South Carolina and Georgia is generally the middle
of the Savannah River. None of the crew came from South
Carolina and they were lodged and took their meals on the
Georgia side of the river. Supplies and equipment were
procured from Georgia and Florida and the defendant's
headquarters were located in Georgia. Furthermore, the
defendant was a Florida corporation, not domesticated in
South Carolina, and owned no property in South Carolina.
162 [VCol. 14
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In reaching its determination that the defendant was
doing business within the State of South Carolina at the time
of the accident, the Court recognized that recent decisions
have tended to discard the older concepts:
. .. 'whereby jurisdiction was accorded on the fictional
premise of the corporation's implied consent or on the
theory that the corporation is 'present' wherever its
activities are carried on, and to substitute therefor, as
the jurisdictional test, the requirement that the corpora-
tion have such contact with the state of the forum 'that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."'
Recognizing further that the above stated principle is in
itself "nebulous," the Court in its application in the instant
case considered the duration of the corporate activity in the
state of the forum, the character of the acts giving rise to
the suit, and the circumstances of their commission. The
opinion specifically reserved any holding on the question
as to whether jurisdiction may be justified from the com-
mission of a single tortious act within the state, although the
corporation may not have been "doing business" in the gen-
erally accepted constitutional sense of that phrase. Because
of the extensive nature of the defendant's operations over a
long period of time, the Court did not feel called upon to de-
cide that question.
The case of Ex Parte Stone9 involved an alleged infrac-
tion of Sections 4-401, et seq. of the 1952 South Carolina
Code of Laws, which declares all places where persons are
permitted to resort for the purpose of drinking alcoholic liq-
uors or beverages to be nuisances and provides for the punish-
ment of persons who operate such places. Section 4-405
provides for the issuance of an injunction restraining such
persons from keeping, receiving, bartering, selling or giving
away any alcoholic liquors until further order of the court
and Section 4-406 provides for punishment for contempt in
the case of any person violating any such restraining order.
In the instant case, the defendants (husband and wife),
upon the petition of the Circuit Solicitor, verified by the
Chief of Police of Chester, alleging the defendants' operation
9. 236 S. C. 263, 113 S. E. 2d 786 (1960).
10
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of a place where alcoholic liquors were unlawfully sold, called
the "Teenage Canteen," were by order of the resident Judge
of the Sixth Circuit, dated August 17, 1959, "temporarily
restrained and enjoined from keeping, receiving, bartering,
selling or giving away any alcoholic liquors"; and were re-
quired to show cause on October 10, 1959, why such restrain-
ing order should not be made permanent.
The defendants filed a demurrer and an answer to the
Solicitor's petition, together with a notice of a motion for
an order sustaining the demurrer and dissolving or clarify-
ing the restraining order to be heard on September 5. Ap-
parently the hearing on this motion was postponed.
Thereafter, on November 20, 1959, the Solicitor filed a
petition duly verified by the Chief of Police of the city of
Chester, alleging that the defendants, after the issuance of
the above mentioned restraining order, had continued to
sell alcoholic liquors unlawfully at the "Teenage Canteen."
On this petition, the resident Judge of the Sixth Judicial
Circuit issued an order requiring the defendants to show
cause before him on December 10, 1959 why they should
not be held in contempt of court.
At the hearing on the rule, the testimony was in sharp
conflict as to whether the defendants had violated the re-
straining order. However, on December 28, 1959 an order
was filed, finding the defendant, James I. Langley, in con-
tempt of court for disobeying the restraining order, and im-
posing a fine and a prison sentence upon him. This order
also discharged the rule as to the co-defendant wife.
The defendant, James I. Langley, appealed from the order
adjudging him in contempt upon several grounds, the prin-
cipal of which was that the restraining order was "in-
valid and void because it was too general and beyond the
powers of the court." This objection was based on the fact
that the order attempted to restrain the defendant from sell-
ing liquor independently of the place where the nuisance
existed. The Supreme Court, while recognizing that the
scope of the restraining order was beyond that permitted by
the statute, nevertheless held that the defendant was obli-
gated at least to obey the valid part until it was set aside
nr revoked.
[Vol. 14
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The interesting constitutional question involved in this
case is the right of the State to provide for the imprisonment
of a person for a statutory violation after a hearing before
a judge and without a jury trial. The right to a trial by a
jury is preserved in several articles of our State Constitution
of 1895 (Article I, Section 18, Article V, Section 22, and
Article I, Section 25). Article I, Section 25, provides spec-
ifically "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved in-
violate."
The effect of these constitutional provisions is to preserve
the right to jury trial in those cases where it was allowed
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; and, of course,
jury trials were not allowed as a matter of right in equity
cases. It has always been within the jurisdiction of the court
of equity to abate a nuisance and its jurisdiction in such cases
is not affected by the fact that the creation or maintenance
of the nuisance is a crime under the common law or by vir-
tue of statutory enactment.
Of course the Legislature's right to declare common nui-
sances is not unlimited. In 1896, however, the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that the Legislature has the power to
declare places where liquor is sold contrary to law, to be com-
mon nuisances and to provide for their abatement. 10
Owner's Rights in Constitutional Taking of Property
In the case of Moseley v. South Carolina Highway Dep't"
the plaintiff hotel owner alleged that he had suffered damages
when the street in front of his hotel in the town of McBee
was elevated as part of a highway improvement project by
the State Highway Department, causing surface water after
each heavy rainfall to be cast upon his property. The town
had approved the plans and specifications for the project.
In its answer, the Highway Department, in addition to
alleging that the plaintiff had suffered no damages, fur-
ther alleged that under the statute and the contract between
the town of McBee and the Highway Department, the town
assumed any and all liability arising out of the street im-
provements. The Highway Department therefore asserted
that the plaintiff's action could be brought only against the
10. Ex Parte Keeler, 45 S. C. 537, 23 S. E. 863 (1896).
11. 236 S. C. 499, 115 S. E. 2d 172 (1960).
1962]
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town of McBee. The town of McBee also filed an answer
and the Highway Department moved to dismiss the action
as to the Department. This appeal by the Highway Depart-
ment was from an order of the lower court denying its said
motion.
It was apparently conceded by the parties that the allega-
tions in the complaint were sufficient to charge a taking
of private property for public use within the meaning of
Article I, Section 17, of the South Carolina Constitution.12
The Highway Department based its motion for dismissal upon
Sections 33-173, 33-174 and 33-232 of the Code of Laws of
South Carolina, 1952. The Court concluded that Section
33-23413 referred only to tort actions and was not applicable
in the instant case where the plaintiff was seeking compen-
sation under the Constitution for a taking of his property by
the State.
The Court was principally concerned with the effect of
Sections 33-173 and 33-174 upon the question in issue. These
sections, in effect, provide for a municipality's approval of
any proposed Highway Department work within its limits,
and further provide for the municipality's assumption -of
"all liability which the Department might otherwise have
as a result of damage to property or persons resulting from
such improvement ... ." Section 33-174 provides in part:
The performance of work within a municipality by the
Department shall not result in the assumption by the
Department of any liability whatever on account of da-
mages to property, injuries to persons, or death growing
out of or in any way connected with such work.
In construing these sections, the Court agreed with the High-
way Department's interpretation that the language used is
12. S. C. CONST. art. I, § 17: ". .. Private property shall not be taken
for private use without the consent of the owner, nor for public use with-
out just compensation being first made therefor."
13. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 33-234 (1952): "Any person
suffering damage to property or injuries or death by reason of the con-
struction, reconstruction or maintenance of any highway or section of
highway, as provided in Sec. 33-112 and 33-171, within the limits of any
municipality of the State shall have such right of action against the
municipality in which such damages, injuries or death may be suffered
as is provided by law applicable to municipalities and the remedy thus
afforded shall be exclusive. But no person bringing a suit against any
municipality shall recover property damage in excess of one thousand
five hundred dollars or damages in case of personal injury or death in
excess of four thousand dollars .. ."
[Vol. 14
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broad enough to include liability of any kind growing out
of the construction and maintenance of state highways with-
in the corporate limits of a municipality. However, the Court
did not construe the sections in question as relieving the
Highway Department of liability for its acts in taking pri-
vafe property for a public use. The opinion stated: "[Tihe
word 'assumption' there used presupposes original liability-
of the Highway Department. It was orly sought to fix the
liability of these two departments of the government inter
sese." Thus, it upheld the plaintiff's right to join the High-
way Department in his suit, with the right to the Highway
Department to reimbursement from the municipality.
Inasmuch as the Court found that the Legislature and the
statutes in question did not undertake to limit the property
owner's right of action, it did not decide whether the State
can authorize one of its agencies or departments to take
private property for public use and also relieve it of liability
and require the landowner to proceed against another agency
or department to obtain compensation.
In the case of State -. Langley14 the question before the
Court was the constitutionality of Section 5-624.2 of the
Amendment to the Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952,
making it unlawful for a pinball machine operator to per-
mit a minor under the age of 18 to play or operate the
machine. It was admitted that the defendant was an operator
of such a machine and that at the time of his arrest, a 17
year old minor was playing such a machine in his place of
business. The defendant asserted that the said act was vio-
lative of Article I, Section 5 of the South Carolina Constitu-
tion and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution. ,
The Court in upholding the defendant's conviction held
that the General Assembly has the right to regulate the
operation of a pinball machine which, in the opinion of the
Court, is conducive to wagering or gaming. The Court pointed
out that the act in question is not prohibitory but is regulatory
merely, and permissible under the police power for the bene-
fit of the public's safety, health, peace, morals or general
welfare.
14. 236 S. C. 583, 115 S. E. 2d 308 (1960).
S1962] 167
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol14/iss2/2
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
The case of Atlanta & Charlotte Airline Ry. v. Spartan-
burg Tenminal Co.15 involved the question of whether one
railroad corporation may cross by its tracks the right-of-way
and tracks of another railway without prior order of the
State Public Service Commission. The crossing in this case
was to be by means of a tunnel under the tracks of the
Atlanta and Charlotte Airline and Railway Company and
Souther~n Railway Company in the city of Spartanburg.
The lower court sustained a demurrer to the appellant's
complaint for an injunction against respondent's proceeding
in condemnation of the right-of-way, although the complaint
alleged that the respondent, Spartanburg Terminal Company,
"has not obtained the necessary authority of the South Caro-
lina Public Service Commission before construction of said
tunnel." The lower court felt that the Commission's approval
was unnecessary in view of the fact that the respondent had
obtained a certificate of public convenience and necessity
from the Federal Interstate Commerce Commission.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower court,
stating:
It is elementary that the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission has exclusive jurisdiction over the extension of
the lines of railroads that are engaged in interstate
transportation, which those here concerned are; but it
does not follow that the State is thereby deprived of
its police power to regulate reasonably the location and
construction in order, in good faith, to insure the max-
imum safety and convenience of the public.
Therefore, the Court concluded that the respondent must
comply with Section 58-991 of the Code of Laws of South
Carolina, 1952, which gives the South Carolina Public Ser-
vice Commission power to regulate and control the crossing by
one railroad of the tracks of another.
In the case of Olan Mills v. Town of Kingstree16 the Court
had under consideration an order of the lower court sus-
taining a demurrer against a complaint wherein the plain-
tiffs sought to recover $45 paid to the town of Kingstree
under protest for a business license.
15. 237 S. C. 404, 117 $. E. 2d 574 (1960).
16. 236 S. C. 535, 115 S. E. 2d 52 (1960).
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The complaint had alleged that the plaintiff was a Tenn-
essee corporation with its principal place of business in
Chattanooga, Tennessee, where it developed and processed its
film, manufactured its proofs, and processed and finished
the finished photographs sold by itinerant representatives
who solicited orders for photographs from door to door; that
these representatives collect a deposit, take the picture, for-
ward the exposed film to Chattanooga for printing and then
present the customer with the printed pictures for his selec-
tion after they have been returned from Chattanooga; that
finally the approved proofs are processed in Chattanooga and
the finished photographs mailed to the customer.
In reversing the lower court the Supreme Court followed
a long line of cases dealing with the same question and cited
in the opinion. The Court pointed to the interstate nature of
the plaintiffs' operations and concluded:
The instances occurring in the State of South Carolina
are not separable from those occurring in the State of
Tennessee but are so connected in fact that they become
an integral part of the process with each step being de-
pendent upon the other for fruition.
The Court quoted with approval from the opinion in the de-
cision of Oktn Mills, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee,'1 "'We must
hold, as we do, that the ordinance under attack is invalid, as
to appellant, as an attempt to place a direct tax upon the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.'
In the case of Deese v. Williams,'3 which was concerned
mainly with a venue question more fully considered else-
where in this review, the Court restated the familiar prin-
ciple that the legislative power of the General Assembly is
plenary except as restricted by the State or Federal Constitu-
tion.
In the case of Southern Ry. Co. v. South Carolina State
Highway Dep't, et al.19 the Court reaffirms the rule that
constitutional questions will not be determined unless their
determination is essential to the dispositon of the case. In
this connection, it should be noted that this rule is subject
17. 100 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1958).
18. 236 S. C. 292, 113 S. E. 2d 823 (1960).
19. 237 S. C. 75, 115 S. E. 2d 685 (1960).
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to an exception when earnestly argued public questions of
great public importance are raised on the record. In such
cases, the courts have decided such questions of public interest
for future guidance, however abstract or moot they may have
become in the immediate context.20
Double Standard Established for
Issuing Richland County Bonds
In an earlier reviewed case,21 decided in 1959, the Supreme
Court in construing an amendment to the Constitution re-
lating to the bonded debt of York County when the proceeds
of its bonds are to be used for highway and bridge construc-
tion, concluded that it in effect established a separate and
distinct 18 per cent debt limit, and that none of the bonds
issued within the meaning of the amendment need be con-
sidered in computing York County's 8 per cent debt limitation
under Section 5 of Article X of the South Carolina Constitu-
tion. That opinion was written by Justice Legge who also
wrote the opinion in Reese v. Talbert,22 which in effect in-
terprets a constitutional amendment relating to the bonded
indebtedness of Richland County as establishing a separate
method in which the bonds :referred to in the amendnient must
be authorized distinct from the manner in which county bonds
not referred to in the amendment can be authorized.
Section 5 of Article X of the South Carolina Constitution
of 1895 imposes upon a county the 8 per cent and the. 15 per
cent debt limitation. Section 6 of Article X enumerates the
purposes for which a county can levy a tax or issue bonds.
These purposes do not expressly include a public hospital.
The amendment in question here, which was ratified Feb-
ruary 25th, 1921, provides that the limitations of Sections 5
and 6 of Article X:
S.. shall not apply to the bonded indebtedness incurred
by the County of Richland, when the proceeds of any
bonds issued by said county are applied exclusively to
the purpose of erection, improvement and maintenance
of a public hospital and court house or in payment of
debts incurred, and when the question of incurring'such
20. Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer Dist., 211 S. C. 77, 44 S. E.
2d 88 (1947).
21. Knight v. Allen, 234 S. C. 563, 109 S. E. 2d 579, 13 S. C. L. Q.
298 (1959).
22. 237 S. C. 356, 117 S. t. 2d 375 (1960).
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indebtedness is submitted to the qualified electors of
said county, as provided by law.
The act here under attack had authorized the issuance of
Richland County general obligation bonds to be used for the
improvement and renovation of existing public hospital facil-
ities and made no provision for an election in connection
therewith. The question before the Court was whether under
the language of the amendment an election was a requisite for
the issuance of the bonds.
The opinion noted that when the amendment was enacted it
was doubtful whether a public hospital was one of the pur-
poses for which a county could issue bonds under Section 6
of Article X. (This question was not set at rest until the 1924
decision in Battle v. Willcox 2 3 which held that a public hos-
pital was a corporate purpose of a county.) Furthermore,
the Court pointed to the history of legislative enactments
subsequent to the amendment here in question and noted that
all enactments of the Legislature authorizing bonds pursuant
to this amendment required as'a condition precedent to their
issuance a public election thereon.
The Court, therefore, invalidated the act under which the
proposed bonds were to be issued and held that the amend-
ment requires the vote of the qualified electors of Richland
County on the qitestion of the issuance of the proposed bonds.
In concluding this article, we cannot fail to take note of
the untimely death of the late Chief Justice Taylor H. Stukes.
A sound lawyer and a conscientious judge in all aspects of
the law, the late Chief Justice excelled in the field of con-
stitutional problems, and his keen insight into problems in
this field made his decisions clear and lucid. Furthermore,
the late Chief Justice was at all times mindful of the import-
ance of the doctrine of separation of powers and was care-
ful to reserve to the Legislature problems which the Con-
stitution had left to that body. His observation which we have
-earlier quoted in the case of Cox v. Bates, supra, to the effect
that the basis to the attack was largely political rather than
judicial, typifies the sound judicial restraint for which his
opinions were noted. His untimely death leaves a void which
will be noted particularly in this field, but his opinions should
serve as guideposts for coming generations of judges and
lawyers.
23. 128 S. C. 500, 122 S. E. 516. (1924).
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